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: The Military Diplomacy of General Charles Foulkes and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization

Equal Partners, Though
Not Of Equal Strength
The Military Diplomacy of General Charles Foulkes
and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
Michael W. Manulak

S

tudents of Canadian foreign policy
learn extensively of the pioneering
role politicians and diplomats like
Louis St. Laurent, Lester Pearson, and
Hume Wrong played in realizing the
North Atlantic Treaty in April 1949.
There is a large literature that tells
the story of an inﬂuential Canadian
diplomacy that coaxed a reluctant
US government toward supporting
European security. Perhaps because
military ofﬁcials are often less inclined
to publish memoirs, the military side
of the negotiations has not received
similar historical treatment. One
aspect of Canada’s role in forging
the alliance that has been largely
ignored is the military diplomacy of
the Department of National Defence
(DND) and, particularly, chief of the
general staff, Lieutenant-General
Charles Foulkes.
This article will examine Foulkes’
military diplomacy from 1949-1951,
as he sought to ensure representation
in allied decision-making when
Canadian resources were deployed
by NATO. The alliance in this period
had two distinct developmental
stages, necessitating two separate
approaches to alliance representation.
The ﬁrst stage, occurring before the
North Atlantic Treaty (NAT) military
structure was finalized, saw the

Abstract: Much has been written about the
leading role of diplomats Lester Pearson,
Hume Wrong, and Escott Reid in forging
the North Atlantic Treaty in 1948-1949.
Regrettably, much less attention has been
devoted in the literature to the equally
important contributions of LieutenantGeneral Charles Foulkes, then Canada’s
chief of the general staff, to the alliance
military structure. This essay charts
Foulkes’ military diplomacy through two
distinct stages. The ﬁrst stage saw the
dissemination of the “Foulkes Plan”,
the alliance’s first structural planning
document. The second stage was deﬁned
by Foulkes’ efforts to ensure Canadian
representation by empowering the NATO
Military Committee. Through pragmatic
diplomacy, focused on Canadian interests,
Foulkes made a considerable contribution
to NATO’s military organization and
operations.

dissemination of the “Foulkes Plan,”
NATO’s first structural planning
document. By taking the initiative
in organizational planning, Foulkes
sought to institutionalize a privileged
position for Canada within the
new alliance. The second stage,
occurring once the alliance structure
was finalized, included the early
operations of the NATO Military
Committee and the related “Canadian
proposal” for alliance reorganization.
At this stage, Foulkes observed that,
in practice, NATO military affairs
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tilted heavily toward US–UK–French
dominance. As a result, Foulkes
reoriented his strategy toward
empowering the NATO Military
Committee as the primary means of
ensuring Canadian representation.
Foulkes’ efforts, pragmatic rather
than visionary, signiﬁcantly shaped
the alliance.
Foulkes served as Canadian
chief of the general staff (CGS) from
1945-51 and then as chair of the chiefs
of staff committee from 1951-60.
According to J.L. Granatstein, Foulkes
was the “only military politician
with the ability and clout to deal on
even terms with the public service
mandarins.”1 Viewed as “dour, short,
cold, but very shrewd,” Foulkes
ascended the ranks during the Second
World War with particular support
from General H.D.G. Crerar. 2 He
was appointed chief of the general
staff in 1945 primarily because of
his bureaucratic ability and his
suitable understanding of the role
of the military in postwar society.3
Having served as commander of the
I Canadian Corps during the war and
then as CGS, by 1948 Foulkes had
cultivated close relationships with his
British and American counterparts.4
The NATO treaty was signed
in Washington on 4 April 1949.
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The signatories included Belgium,
Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland,
Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands,
Norway, Portugal, the United
Kingdom, and the United States.
At the time of ratification, NATO
countries were profoundly concerned
about the strategic imbalance in
Europe. It was estimated that NATO
could muster about 14 active divisions
compared to a projected 175 Soviet
divisions. Although it was generally
assumed the Soviet Union would not
risk open war, it did aid communist
forces indirectly and through armed
intimidation. An American general
was reported to have mused that all
the Soviets needed was “some good
pairs of boots” to conquer Western
Europe. 5 This caused great alarm
and strengthened western resolve to
contain further Soviet expansion. As
a result, NATO’s primary objective
was to provide an effective and
credible deterrent. The effectiveness
16
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of this deterrent would be achieved
by augmenting NATO’s military
capacity to respond to the Soviet
threat. The credibility of the deterrent
would be enhanced by creating an
organizational structure capable of
coordinating its multinational forces.
It was believed that these measures
would boost European conﬁdence
and invigorate their defence efforts.
All of these ends could be met
by establishing an organization
capable of managing rearmament
and military planning. This task
was complicated by the signiﬁcant
diversity of interests represented
among the membership of the new
alliance.
The text of the NAT, complete
by March 1949, was largely silent
on questions of alliance structure.
Article 9 spoke vaguely of an allied
council and defence committee. On
2 April 1949, allied foreign ministers
agreed to postpone formal discussion

of structure until the treaty had been
signed and ratiﬁed.6 For the US, UK,
Canada, and France, this pause in
negotiations would allow them to
reach agreement on an acceptable
organization before an alliance-wide
working group convened to consider
the matter formally in preparation for
the September 1949 meeting of the
NATO foreign ministers.
Canadian considerations of the
NATO military organization were
conditioned by memories of the
wartime US-UK Combined Chiefs of
Staff, which conducted the war with
minimal consultation. The wartime
Supreme Commander of the Allied
Expeditionary Force was appointed in
1944 without any consultation with,
or formal delegation of authority
from, the Canadian government.
Since 1946, however, Canada had
participated in a secret trilateral
“ABC” strategic planning forum with
the United States and Britain which
gave Canadians access to high level
planning and intelligence. Therefore,
Canadian ofﬁcials in the Department
of National Defence believed that it
was in Canada’s interest to prevent
a return to the Combined Chiefs of
Staff and to ensure an arrangement
similar to the ABC forum. This
was considered to be particularly
important when decisions were
taken about the nature and extent of
Canadian contributions to NATO.
To meet these interests, General
Foulkes developed a plan for the
NAT defence organization. In March
1949, he circulated a “purely personal
paper” proposing a structure for the
alliance to Major-General Alfred
Gruenther (US Director of the
Combined Staff) in Washington and
Major-General Sir Leslie Hollis (UK
Chief Staff Ofﬁcer to the Minister of
Defence) in London. The primary
basis of the “Foulkes Plan” was
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General Charles Foulkes, chief of the
general staff, played an important
behind-the-scenes role to ensure
Canada’s voice at NATO.
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a series of interlocking “Regional
Planning Groups” (RPGs), which
were designed to ensure a degree
of regional autonomy and initiative
in coordinating allied defences.
Countries that did not contribute to
the defence of a given region would
not have representation. This ensured
that the groups were small, efﬁcient,
and most importantly, relatively
secure from Soviet espionage. As a
means of aggregating this regional
planning into a broader strategic
concept, Foulkes proposed a Supreme
Commander or Combined Chiefs
committee. Although he preferred
a Supreme Commander, Foulkes
recognized that a Combined Chiefs
body might be more politically
acceptable. A final element of his
plan was the “Strategic Reserve
Group” (SRG), composed only of the
countries likely to have uncommitted
reserves of personnel and materials for
continental Europe: the United States,
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new alliance, and ensure that Canada
was able to determine the nature and
extent of its contribution to North
Atlantic defence.
On 24 March, General Hollis
met with Lieutenant-Colonel R.L.
Raymont, the Canadian Joint
Liaison Ofﬁcer in London, to discuss
Foulkes’ memo. While welcoming the
Canadian initiative, Hollis conveyed
profound reservations about the
regional basis of the plan. Hollis had
envisioned a structure predicated
on Western European defence and
thought that a regional framework
would dilute NATO’s European
focus by implying an equal emphasis
on Scandinavian and North American
security. His concern that this could
provide an avenue for a return to
North American isolationism was
reinforced by the fact that Foulkes did
not envision Canadian membership
in the Western European RPG. Under
the proposed structure, argued Hollis,

Lester B. Pearson (left, with hand on chin), W.L. Mackenzie King (at head of the
table) and Charles Foulkes (to the right of King) confer at the NATO conference.
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Britain, and Canada. The Strategic
Reserve Group would collaborate
with the Supreme Commander or
NATO Combined Chiefs to deploy
its forces with a view to broader
strategic imperatives.7 All of these
bodies would function under the
Defence Committee, described in
article 9 of the NAT.
Foulkes’ plan provided an
efficient means of mobilizing the
deterrent and protecting Canadian
interests. By giving the Europeans
responsibility for their own defence
through the RPGs, Canada would
also be under less pressure to send
troops to Europe in peacetime.
Foulkes recognized that this would
be politically important because the
Canadian public and its government
were unlikely to support such a
deployment. The SRG would prevent
a return to the old Combined Chiefs
of Staff, institutionalize Canada’s
privileged planning role within the
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Left: Signing of the North Atlantic Treaty,
Washington DC, 4 April 1949.

NATO Photos

Below: External Affairs minister Lester
Pearson signs the NATO Treaty for
Canada.

Canada would offer little more than
“good wishes” to European defence.8
In addition, Hollis contended that
a Supreme Commander would be
politically unacceptable and that the
Strategic Reserve Group would imply
further detachment from European
defence. In the case of the Supreme
Commander, Hollis suggested that
a Combined Chiefs composed of the
US, UK, and Canada should carry out
strategic direction “on the lines of the
present ABC set up.”
The British presented an
alternative vision to American
planners. After exploring means
of ensuring US-UK dominance of
strategic planning, 9 the UK Joint
Services Mission composed a plan
which sought to graft the NAT
military organization onto the
nascent Western Union Defence
Organization. The British plan
allowed for only two committees:
a Western European committee
composed of the US, Canada, and
the signatories of the Brussels Pact;10
and an Atlantic Ocean subcommittee
limited to the US, UK, Canada, and
France. Representatives from the
other NATO countries would be
consulted only when necessary.11 The
proposal also advocated a Combined
Chief “Steering Committee,” which
18
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would be limited to
the US, UK, Canada,
and France. The
Steering Committee
was to be located
in London, which
would allow the high-level Canadian
and American representatives on
the NATO committee to sit as
observers on the Western Union
Defence Organization. This overlap
of representation would ensure that
“the decisions of the Western Union
Chiefs of Staff would be automatically
ratiﬁed by the Atlantic Pact Chiefs of
Staff.”12
Undeterred, Foulkes went to
Washington in April 1949 to discuss
his proposal with US officials.
Although he found that US military
planners were still in the preliminary
stages of their consideration of the
matter, Foulkes was pleased to ﬁnd
that his paper had been reproduced
and circulated to various Pentagon
directors for comment. He discovered
that it had made a very favourable
impression. General Omar Bradley,
the US Army chief of staff, argued that
the proposed regional arrangements
“were the only ones which would
be workable in the Atlantic Pact.”
Regarding the British proposal,
Bradley “did not favour any further

extension of US responsibility within
the Western Union.” The Americans
also appeared much more amenable
than the British to the idea of having
a NATO Supreme Commander.
In fact, General Gruenther went
so far as to suggest that former
Supreme Commander of the Allied
Forces in Europe, US General Dwight
Eisenhower, might be “drafted”
to head the alliance military
organization. In the event that a
Combined Chiefs organization was
formed, US ofﬁcials favoured a USUK-Canada-France membership.13
Although his SRG concept seemed
to have little traction, most elements
of Foulkes’ plan now appeared to
stand a good chance of being adopted.
On 19 April, Foulkes summarized the
results of his Washington meetings:
“From these conversations I am left
with the opinion that the…principles
which are contained in the Canadian
paper will most likely be accepted
as a basis for setting-up a military
organization… If these principles are
accepted it would appear to satisfy
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It would clearly be inappropriate
and unwise for us to take a leading
part in putting forward proposals for
the form that defence organization

Probably still hearing the cautious
echoes of retired Prime Minister
William Lyon Mackenzie King
in the halls of the East Block of
the Parliament buildings, Heeney
warned that a position on the Steering
Committee might entail a contribution
of personnel and materials consistent
with that position. Heeney’s concerns
may also have been inﬂuenced by the
knowledge that Ottawa would soon
be considering its contributions to
European mutual aid.
On 12 May 1949 the Cabinet
Defence Committee met in Ottawa
to discuss the matter. Foulkes
argued that Canada should push
for a role on the Standing Group,
since “planning…would inevitably
involve the use of Canadian troops
and Canadian facilities and the Chiefs
of Staff considered that Canada
should be represented on the senior
planning body.” Secretary of State
for External Affairs Lester Pearson,
fresh from a brieﬁng with Heeney,
argued that Canada should seek
representation only “when matters of
direct concern to Canada were being

discussed.” The cabinet concluded
that “Canada should not actively
seek representation on the senior
military body,” but would accept
an invitation if offered.16 Canadian
ambassador in Washington Hume
Wrong immediately met with John
D. Hickerson, the US Assistant
Secretary of State for United Nations
Affairs, to communicate this policy.
The same day, Heeney sought to
disarm Foulkes by insisting that
talks on the military organization
should be conducted exclusively by
the Embassy in Washington, rather
than by Foulkes and his staff. 17
Canadian membership on the Steering
Committee, however, continued to
appear in British proposals as late as
July 1949.18 Perhaps alarmed by this
prospect, Wrong again raised the
question that August with George
Perkins, US Assistant Secretary
of State for European Affairs, and
restated the Canadian policy.19
On 23 June the US Joint Chiefs
of Staff (JCS) ﬁnally completed its
own set of recommendations on the
NATO military organization. The

LAC C 44826

lantic Treaty,
49.

the Canadian interests.” Without
his planned SRG, Foulkes turned
his attention to finding a way of
formalizing Canada’s privileged ABC
planning position within NATO –
“it will still be necessary to form
some kind of vehicle in which the
present strategic planning of UK
US and Canada can be continued
without creating an atmosphere
which will be injurious to the proper
development of territorial defence in
each region.”14 British and American
support for Canadian participation on
an allied Combined Chiefs “Steering
Committee” was a promising means
of ensuring representation when
planning occurred with implications
for Canadian resources.
Foulkes’ optimism was quickly
tempered by developments in
External Affairs. The reports ﬂowing
from Foulkes’ pen, particularly those
concerning Canadian participation
on an allied military Steering
Committee, caused Undersecretary
of State for External Affairs Arnold
Heeney to worry that Canada would
be overwhlemed with military
commitments:

might take under the Atlantic
Treaty. It could indeed prove very
embarrassing if we were to insist
on any given scheme for our own
representation and then find that
we seriously disagreed with the
criteria proposed by other countries
for apportioning the burden in men,
money or supplies.15

External Affairs and National Defence
had different viewpoints on the role
Canada should play in NATO. Here Lester
Pearson and Arnold Heeney sit in a NATO
Council meeting. General Foulkes is
visible in the second row (with his arms
crossed).
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plan supported Foulkes’ regional
concept and reinforced the emerging
consensus on the need for a Steering
Group. The JCS, which wanted to
keep the committee small, took
the view that a maximum of three
countries should be included as
Steering Group members in their
August Working Group proposals.
These three would be the US, UK,
and France. The JCS also proposed
a “Military Advisory Council,”
composed of the chiefs of staff of all
NATO countries.
In August 1949 the Joint
Chiefs toured Western Europe to
ascertain the views of allied military
authorities. The meetings produced
general agreement on the alliance
organization, with a few exceptions.
The most important disagreement
arose over the composition of the
Steering Committee, with Italy
demanding membership, and France
and Norway advocating a Canadian
seat on the committee.20 Canadian
membership was also advocated “for
political reasons” by the US State
Department, but blocked by the JCS,
which insisted that the committee
should be no larger than three.21
With general agreement on
the allied military structure, the
NATO Working Group conferred
in Washington on 22 August 1949.
Canada was represented by its
Washington Embassy counsellor
George Ignatieff and, in the
background, by Ambassador Hume
Wrong. The primary Canadian
objective at the meetings was to
advance a consultative formula
ensuring that non-Steering Committee
countries would have representation
on the committee when items of
“direct concern” were discussed.
This formula, originally suggested
by Pearson, sought to prevent the use
of Canadian troops without adequate
consultation. 22 For Foulkes, this
provision would principally protect
Canadian interests since Canada was
likely to be the only non-Steering

20
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Committee ally that would contribute
troops outside of its region.
The Canadian negotiators were
shocked to learn that the JCS was
“somewhat perturbed” by the
Canadian representation formula
and reluctant to grant it.23 Pearson
instructed Ignatieff to demonstrate
that this was a “minimum Canadian
requirement,” implying that Canada
would reconsider its participation in
the alliance if the formula was not
approved. Pearson even contemplated
a personal visit to Washington to
“stand ﬁrm on this no matter what
the Chiefs of Staff think.”24 Although
the JCS eventually assented to the
Canadian consultative formula, it
would come to mean little, as the big
three interpreted the provision very
loosely.
The Foulkes Plan outlined
what, in effect, became the military
organization of NATO.25 The basis
for the alliance structure approved
in October 1949 was the Regional
Planning Groups, the ostensible
centre of regional planning and allied
defence. The Standing Group (the
new, more acceptable, nomenclature
for the Steering Committee), with
Britain, France and the United States
as members, would be in continuous
session to convert the work of
the RPGs into a broader strategic
concept. The Standing Group,
which embodied the Combined
Chiefs committee concept proposed
by Foulkes, came to represent an
executive group for the alliance.
As suggested by the JCS, a Military
Committee was formed at the chiefs
of staff level with representation
for all allies. As a means of liaison
between the Standing Group and
the smaller powers, “Accredited
Representatives” were appointed in
Washington to coordinate the work of
the Military Committee and Standing
Group.
With the alliance forged and its
structure ﬁnalized in October 1949,
Foulkes turned his attention to the

protection of Canadian interests
by guaranteeing a seat at the table
when important decisions involving
the use of troops and resources
were made. He soon discovered,
however, that this objective ran
counter to NATO’s inclination
toward Standing Group supremacy.
Although technically subordinate to
the Military Committee, the Standing
Group was always intended to be
an “executive committee” in which
key allies would “limit the real work
of the Military Committee,” so as to
create an alliance structure “more in
accordance with the realities of the
situation.”26 Aside from presenting an
obstacle to Foulkes’ representational
objectives, this arrangement caused
considerable embarrassment when
the Standing Group sought to hector
its smaller allies into supporting
proposals without sufficient time
to secure instructions from their
governments. Foulkes, always aware
of Ottawa’s political climate, soon
found this arrangement intolerable.
The Standing Group’s actions
necessitated a fundamental
reorientation of Canada’s alliance
interests toward strengthening the
position of the Military Committee
to ensure that the “overall direction
of the alliance must be carried on by
the alliance as a whole, an alliance
in which we were all equal partners,
though not of equal strength.”27 The
Military Committee, however, had
important structural weaknesses,
as defence expert Douglas Bland
argues. It only met annually; its
chair rotated, detracting from any
sustained leadership; it had no
staff or secretariat; and, it had an
extremely broad mandate, which
obscured its role. 28 Furthermore,
the urgency of European defence
allowed the Standing Group to cite its
own relative efﬁciency and security
as a justification for withholding
information and avoiding genuine
consultation with the Military
Committee.
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As a means of overcoming the
Military Committee’s structural
weaknesses, Foulkes and defence
minister Brooke Claxton came to work
closely with NATO’s non-Standing
Group members to ensure genuine
consultation. Aside from shared
interests, Foulkes found that support
for curbing the Standing Group’s
authority was ripened by a sense
that a problem existed with allied
operations. In particular, the tactics
employed by the Standing Group
to secure adoption of the Medium
Term Defence Plan in March 1950
left a very sour taste in the mouths
of the allies. 29 The plan, calling
for 90 NATO divisions in Europe
by 1954, was widely dismissed as
unrealistic and contributed to a
feeling of hopelessness in the alliance.
As Claxton remembers, this sense of
grievance and discontent provided
an opportunity for Canadian
leadership:

facilitate constructive liaison between
the Military Committee and the
Standing Group. At the ﬁrst session
of the Military Committee in October
1949, Foulkes called on the Standing
Group to furnish the Accredited
Representatives with an agenda prior
to meetings so that these countries
could be adequately prepared for
what was to be discussed. This was
agreed. 31 At the second Military
Committee session in December 1949,
Foulkes requested that the Accredited
Representatives be consulted before
the dissemination of strategic guidance
papers to the RPGs. This suggestion
ran into considerable resistance
from the Standing Group countries,
which emphasized the urgency of
these measures. Foulkes stood ﬁrm,
insisting that he had been told that
the Accredited Representatives
would actively consult with the
Standing Group. They would not
be insigniﬁcant “paper boys.” The
committee acceded to Foulkes’
suggestion.32 Two days later at the
NATO Defence Committee meeting,
the defence ministers from Norway
and Denmark made their acceptance
of the “Review of Progress” paper
conditional on the Standing Group
compliance with the consultative
procedure outlined by Foulkes.33

Somewhat naturally, we came to
be regarded as a leader among the
smaller powers. At almost every
meeting of the Defence Ministers
several of the lesser powers would
discuss privately with members of the
Canadian team some high-handed
action of the Standing Group…they

In the lead up to the October
1950 NATO Defence and Military
Committee meetings, Claxton
and Foulkes advanced a plan that
would convert the Accredited
Representatives into the Military
Committee in permanent session,
not dissimilar from the newly formed
North Atlantic Council “Deputies.”34
At the fourth Military Committee
meeting of that session, Foulkes raised
Claxton’s proposals for deepening
the responsibilities of the Accredited
Representatives. He argued that the
representatives should take part in
the discussion and formulation of
military policy, beyond their current
liaison role. He requested that the
representatives be provided with
papers and agendas sufficiently
in advance to secure feedback and
represent their home governments.
Foulkes’ efforts led to a proposal
that the Military Committee convert
the Accredited Representatives into a
Military Representatives Committee
to fulﬁll this consultative mandate.35
US General Omar Bradley, reminding
the committee of the efficiency of
the Standing Group, stated his
interpretation of the character of
consultation. He suggested “after
any paper has been prepared, it
will be presented to the Committee

would urge us to be their spokesman
in taking some stand or asserting
some point of view vis-à-vis the
Standing Group powers...30

The emerging consensus among the
non-Standing Group members about
the need for better representation
grew into a virtual bloc within alliance
circles and enabled Foulkes’ push for
greater military consultation.
A primary means of achieving this
objective was to strengthen the role
of the Accredited Representatives to
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First Meeting of Council Deputies,
London, 25 July 1950.
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formally established at the joint
session of the North Atlantic Council
and Defence Committee in December
1950. The Military Representatives
Committee contributed to providing
a greater multilateral base within the
alliance by facilitating continuous
contact among the members of the
Military Committee and with the
Standing Group.
Foulkes’ campaign to strengthen
the functions of the Military
Committee continued at the December
1950 session when discussion turned
to the responsibilities associated with
the leadership of the committee.

LAC PA 115227

of Deputies before it is distributed
to the nations of NATO.” Foulkes
countered “when a paper was being
prepared the deputies would be
called in and told that the Standing
Group was preparing a paper on
the following subject. That would
give an opportunity for national
views to be discussed before the
paper is produced.” Foulkes further
requested that non-Standing Group
members be included in the working
parties and secretariats, which
served the Standing Group. This
proposal was adopted.36 The Military
Representatives Committee was

The chair of the Military Committee
was determined on an annual basis
by the representatives of each
NATO country, rotating in English
alphabetical order. This arrangement
was ineffective because non-Standing
Group chairs did not have access
to the papers necessary to advance
the agenda. As a result, meetings
with a non-Standing Group chair
were generally unproductive. 37
As a means of overcoming these
difﬁculties, Belgian General Etienne
Baele requested the assignment of
his personal staff to consult with the
Standing Group prior to assuming the
Military Committee chair. General
Baele’s request was interrupted by
British Air Marshal Sir John Slessor,
who sought to delay consideration of
this proposal.
Foulkes reinforced Baele’s
position by suggesting that the staff
of a non-Standing Group chair should
sit as an observer in Standing Group
meetings and establish a link with the
Standing Group chair in the months
preceding their chairpersonship.
Upon agreement from the Committee,
General Léchères of France suggested
that the committee avoid committing
this arrangement to paper. The
Canadian responded by reminding
the committee:
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Lieutenant-General Foulkes meets
with General Dwight D. Eisenhower in
Ottawa on 26 January 1946. Eisenhower
was to become NATO’s ﬁrst Supreme
Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR)
in 1950.

22
https://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol18/iss2/3

Manulak - Foulkes and NATO.indd 22

8

15/06/2009 3:05:22 PM

: The Military Diplomacy of General Charles Foulkes and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization

mmittee
al basis
f each
English
gement
anding
access
dvance
eetings
p chair
tive. 37
g these
Etienne
ment of
with the
ming the
General
pted by
Slessor,
ation of

aele’s
he staff
should
Group
with the
months
nship.
mmittee,
ggested
mitting
r. The
minding

the whole year. You will also recall
that we got papers the day we came
into the meeting…I am sure that we
must at least get a written record
for the Standing Group about the
arrangements when a non member
becomes Chairman. I am vitally
concerned in this.38

The Canadian and Belgian position
was supported by most of the smaller
countries and forced Slessor to
note that “special arrangements”
ought to be made to allow a nonStanding Group chair to fulfill its
responsibilities more effectively.
The creation of the Military
Representatives Committee, which
became the Military Committee in
Permanent Session several years
later, and the “special arrangements”
for non-Standing Group chair
consultation, contributed to an
erosion of the early supremacy of
the Standing Group powers. Claxton
recalls in his memoirs:
At one particular time one of the
members of the permanent council
stated that non-Standing Group
nations had delegated the control
of their military affairs to the three
major powers. It was this kind of
assumption that brought about
the establishment of the Military

the
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The Military Representatives
Committee allowed NATO’s smaller
allies to address matters that, until
then, would have had to wait for a
session of the Military Committee.
The Canadian contribution to this
structural development strengthened
the hand of the Military Committee
through greater consultative measures
and the establishment of the Military
Representatives Committee.
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As a further means of ensuring that
decisions were taken “by the alliance
as a whole” Foulkes collaborated
closely with the Department of
External Affairs to draft a proposal
for the reorganization of NATO. The
“Canadian proposal,” ﬁrst broached
at the North Atlantic Council in
September 1950, recommended
the creation of one “government
level” council to replace the three
autonomous foreign, defence, and
finance ministerial committees.
Although the proposal was primarily
pursued through the NATO Council of
Deputies (composed of representatives
from allied foreign ministries),
its consideration necessitated
collaboration with the respective
national military authorities. The
proposed reorganization came to
be tied conceptually to the issue
of greater alliance control of the
Standing Group. Recognizing the
opportunity, Foulkes touted the
proposal as a means of improving
consultation by empowering greater
political oversight of NATO military
operations by a body on which all
allies were represented.
An initial paper, composed by
Arnold Heeney, was forwarded to
NATO member governments on 17
November 1950. The draft’s political
aspects generated broad support on
the Council of Deputies, particularly
its proposed amalgamation of
all NATO activities “under one
Supreme Council which would
represent Governments” and its
enhancement of the Council Deputies
as “the active continuing authority
of the NATO.”40 The draft’s military
paragraphs, however, inadvertently
caused “alarm and despondency” in
military circles because they did not
take into account the creation of the
Military Representatives Committee
and they suggested that the NATO
Military Committee be reconstituted
as an advisory body of the Standing
Group. 41 Moreover, the proposed
subordination of the Standing Group

to the Council Deputies generated
consternation within the US, UK,
and French militaries. After a heated
debate on the proposal’s military
dimensions ensued on 12 December,
the proposal was held back by
Canadian officials at US request
until measures for the formation of
SHAPE and the integration of German
forces were further advanced. In the
intervening period, Foulkes redrafted
the proposal’s military section to
bring it “into line” with emerging
alliance military imperatives.
The amended Canadian plan
incorporating Foulkes’ revisions was
circulated to allied governments in
January 1951. On the contentious
relationship between the Deputies
and the Standing Group, Foulkes
proposed compromise language,
suggesting that the Standing Group
“would be guided on political matters
by the [North Atlantic] Council, and
when Council is not in session by
the Council Deputies.” In addition,
the Council Deputies would obtain
“military guidance” from NATO
military authorities. Instead of
making the Military Committee an
advisory body of the Standing Group,
Foulkes proposed the conversion
of the Military Committee into a
“Defence Committee” in permanent
session.42 In all but name, the newly
constituted committee would create
the Military Committee in permanent
session that Foulkes had advocated
in October 1950. If adopted, the plan
would enhance greatly the position
of NATO’s smaller powers vis-à-vis
the Standing Group, even beyond
that envisioned by the creation
of the Military Representatives
Committee.
Foulkes also worked to build
support for the proposal among
his counterparts. To this end,
he continued to place particular
emphasis on the non-Standing Group
countries, since “the smaller nations
still look to Canada to take the lead.”43
At the Council of Deputies meetings
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North Atlantic Council meeting at the
level of foreign ministers, Ottawa,
Canada, 20 September 1951.

NATO Photos

The member countries sign an agreement
on the status of NATO, national
representatives and international staff
(Civilian Status Agreement).

in January 1951, the Canadian
proposal generated support from
the Dutch and Norwegian deputies,
who endorsed the principle of the
Council of Deputy’s primacy over
the Standing Group.44 This position
encountered stiff resistance from
the British representative.45 The US
representative, Charles Spofford, on
the other hand, “said very little” on
the Council, except to his “express
personal view” of support for
positions which had reached virtual
consensus.46 Spofford’s hands (and
the Council’s) were tied until the
US State and Defense Departments
reached ﬁnal agreement on the US
position.
In February 1951, Foulkes visited
Washington to discuss the matter with
General Bradley. Bradley opposed
the notion of extending the Military
Committee to serve in permanent
session, appealing instead to the new
Military Representatives Committee
“to see whether this arrangement
was to be satisfactory.” 47 On the
relationship between the Standing
Group and the Council Deputies,
the JCS proposed that the deputies
“shall provide the Standing Group
with political guidance upon which
strategic decisions should be based.
The Standing Group shall maintain
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close liaison with the Council Deputies
and provide that body with advice on
military matters.” 48 This position,
which incorporated the essential
elements of the Canadian proposal,
represented a signiﬁcant compromise
by the JCS and was obtained only
after considerable discussion with
the State Department. The vocal
appeals of NATO’s “smaller nations”
featured prevalently in necessitating
this compromise. Recognizing the
value of the proposed text, the
Canadian representative conveyed
Canada’s willingness to accept the
proposed text at the 9 April 1951
deputies meeting. NATO’s other
members soon followed.
The “Canadian proposal” was
approved by the North Atlantic
Council on 3 May 1951. The
concessions obtained contributed
to greater oversight of the Standing
Group by the Council Deputies,
where Canada had representation.
Just as importantly, the increasingly
assertive and concerted views
of NATO’s non-Standing Group
powers made the practice of overt
military control by the big three allies
untenable. Although the proposed
extension of the Military Committee
into permanent session was dropped
in the face of JCS opposition, it

brought the item onto the alliance’s
decision agenda and contributed
to its adoption in 1958. On the
political side, the proposal merged
the work of the three committees
into a reconstituted North Atlantic
Council, which would act as “the sole
ministerial body in the Organization,”
charged with “the responsibility of
considering all matters concerning the
implementation of the provisions of
the Treaty.” The role of the Council of
Deputies was also enhanced to become
“the permanent working organization
of the North Atlantic Council.”49 This
is essentially the position of the
NATO Permanent Representatives
today. Accompanying the growth
in the role of the Council Deputies,
an international secretariat was
established to facilitate the work of the
council. These institutional changes
were an important antecedent to the
measures adopted at the 1952 Lisbon
Conference, which established a
North Atlantic Council in permanent
session and NATO’s ﬁrst Secretary
General.
In period from 1949-1951, General
Foulkes sought to protect and project
Canadian interests by establishing a
system within NATO that guaranteed
Canada representation in alliance
affairs. Foulkes’ military diplomacy
took two distinct forms. In the period
before the alliance structure was
finalized, he took the initiative in
allied organization planning to
propose a structure which included
a privileged planning position for
the Canadian military. Once the
organization was formalized and
began to operate, Foulkes undertook
a campaign to strengthen the Military
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Committee through increased
consultation and political oversight
by “the alliance as a whole.” These
efforts, motivated primarily by a
desire to protect Canadian interests,
left a distinct mark on NATO.
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